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‘Never let a good crisis go to waste’*
1. Introduction
The Essay on Financial Crises, published in The Economist of 12 April 
2014, was focused on ‘the slumps that shaped modern ﬁ nance’ considering 
that ﬁ nance is not merely prone to crises, rather ‘it is shaped by them’. As 
some scholars afﬁ rm, to understand the present international ﬁ nancial 
system one should know some history.1 There is nothing new about 
ﬁ nancial crises. They have occurred frequently throughout history. The 
ﬁ ve most devastating crises – starting with America’s ﬁ rst crash in 1792 
and ending with the biggest (before the latest) in 1929 – highlight the 
origin of modern ﬁ nance and the way in which successive reforms have 
tended to insulate investors from risk. Thus they offer lessons to regulators 
and policymakers in the aftermath of the current crisis.2
* Rahm Emanuel, the former chief of staff of US President Barack Obama.
1  R. Bukley and D. Arner, ‘From Crisis to Crisis: The Global Financial System and Reg-
ulatory Failure’, University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper, No. 002/2012.
2  ‘The slumps that shaped modern ﬁ nance’, Essay on Financial Crises, The Econo-
mist, 12.04.2014, pp. 47–53.
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The crisis of 2008 has undermined the previous overwhelming 
conﬁ dence in ﬁ nancial markets. The understanding of the causes of 
the crisis has focused on the capacity of regulators and regulatory 
mechanisms to tackle the ﬁ nancial system. Regulators and politicians 
have struggled to develop new rules, reshape regulatory structures and 
create new regulators. 
There is no doubt that policymakers have recognized the need for 
a greater surveillance capacity and created new bodies and committees 
charged with macro-prudential competences, mostly at the EU and 
global level. However it is worth highlighting that ‘regulators failed not 
just because they did not look hard enough at what was happening in the 
markets. It was also that their cognitive understandings of the way markets 
operated, and the way markets and regulation interacted, were ﬂ awed’.3
Undoubtedly regulators can witness that any attempt to control 
risk-taking behaviour of ﬁ nancial institutions prior to the crisis would 
have been then seen as an intrusion into the management of those 
institutions and as an action against innovation and competitiveness 
in the ﬁ nancial markets. 
The liberalization of ﬁ nancial markets has been rooted in a deep 
conﬁ dence in their ability to self-regulate4 and on the approach of 
traditional neoclassic economics whereby the ﬁ nancial market, like 
other markets for goods and services, is assumed to allocate ﬁ nancial 
assets efﬁ ciently on the basis of pricing mechanisms. 
The recoup of the neoclassic approach to ﬁ nancial markets was also 
an important ingredient in the collapse of the Bretton Woods system 
in the early 1970s,5 as well as the removal of the controls and barriers 
3  J. Black, ‘Restructuring Global and EU Financial Regulation: Character, Capaci-
ties and Learning’ in: Financial Regulation and Supervision. A Post-Crisis Analysis, 
E. Wymeersch, K.J. Hopt and G. Ferrarini (eds.), Oxford 2012, pp. 3–4.
4  ‘Self-regulation by ﬁ nancial market participants […] is somewhat in retreat nowa-
days in part because of its association with discredited “light touch” approaches, Accord-
ing to Joseph Stiglitz the very idea that markets can self-regulate is an “oxymoron”’, E. Fer-
ran, ‘Institutional Design for Financial Market Supervision: The Choice for National 
Systems’, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper, No. 28/2014, p. 12.
5  Even if in 1944 the Bretton Wood system was created to regulate economic re-
lationships among States (in particular for exchanging one currency for another), re-
strictive measures on free movement of capital were also able to assure the monetary 
stability and, in addition, to maintain national organization of the ﬁ nancial markets. In 
the ‘Introduction’ to the book on Global Governance of Financial Systems, just a short 
time before the outbreak of the ﬁ nancial crisis, the authors afﬁ rm that ‘[m]any experts 
agree that adequate regulation at the domestic and international level has not accom-
panied the liberalization of ﬁ nancial markets and, in particular, of short-term capital 
ﬂ ows. […] The removal of the extensive system of domestic and international ﬁ nancial 
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introduced after the Great Crisis of 1929, i.e. the replacement of 
structural supervision mechanisms6 with the prudential supervision 
system. In a nutshell, prudential supervision focuses on ensuring the 
safety and soundness of ﬁ nancial institutions through the oversight 
of their business operations, ﬁ nancial condition, risk management 
practices and corporate governance.
2. Systemic risk matters: how to handle it?
With respect to ﬁ nancial regulation, it is generally acknowledged 
that one of the main tasks of regulators is to contain the risk taken 
by ﬁ nancial institutions to prevent them from spreading systemic 
damage in the system as a whole. Consequently there have been calls 
for increased regulation of systemic risk.
Although the issue of systemic risk has been subjected to considerable 
study, there is a great deal of confusion about what kind of risks are 
systemic and consequently no widespread agreement on how to deﬁ ne 
this concept. As often stated, systemic risk is a ‘slippery concept’ and 
there are a wide variety of sources offering various deﬁ nitions. In 
a recent paper one author lists fourteen different deﬁ nitions given in 
the last decade.7 
and monetary controls that characterized the post-World War II world before 1971 has 
resurrected the pre-war origins of crises in microeconomic as well as macroeconomic 
circumstances. […] Nonetheless, even where crises have microeconomic origins, an im-
portant macroeconomic component remains. […] The reason derives from the fact that 
while commodity markets… involve the pricing of ﬂ ows of goods and services, ﬁ nancial 
markets involve the pricing of stocks of ﬁ nancial assets. Moreover, the price of ﬁ nancial 
asset depends on expectations about its future price […]. Consequently expectations 
play an extraordinary role in the determination of the prices of ﬁ nancial assets, and 
shared expectations are a potent source of macroeconomic contagion’, K. Alexander, 
R. Dhumale and J. Eatwell (eds.), Global Governance of Financial Systems. The Inter-
national regulation of Systemic Risk, Oxford 2006, pp. 3–4.
6  This model was introduced in 1933 by the Glass-Steagal Act and transferred (with 
innovations) to some EU countries (e.g. Italy, 1936). In the US the Glass-Steagal Act 
was abolished in 1999 when President Clinton signed the Gramm-Lech-Biley Act.
7  The deﬁ nitions are in D. Van Hoose, ‘Systemic Risks and Macroprudential Bank 
Regulation: a Critical Appraisal’, Networks Financial Institute Policy Brief, No. 2011-
PB-04, who also afﬁ rms ‘whichever of the two traditional views on systemic risk that 
one chooses as more appealing, there are three key private-market-related factors that 
potentially contribute to systemic risk. The ﬁ rst of these is fractional reserve banking 
[…]. The second key private-market contributor is the potential for banks to engage in 
correlated strategies — or what ﬁ nancial market participants and other observers more 
commonly call herding behaviour […]. The third private-market factor that gives rise to 
systemic risk is network externalities. In general, an externality exists in a market when 
44
Global Safety Governance: Challenges and Solutions
Even though systemic risk is a form of ﬁ nancial risk, it stands 
apart and should be differentiated from traditional ﬁ nancial risk. The 
difference is that ‘traditional ﬁ nancial risk focuses on risks within the 
ﬁ nancial system […]. Conversely, systemic risk focuses on risks to the 
ﬁ nancial system’.8
In the various deﬁ nitions a common factor is the idea that systemic 
risks affect multiple institutions simultaneously, suggesting correlated 
asset strategies, or ‘herding behaviour’. A traditional view of systemic 
risk is ‘the risk that failure of one or a small number of institutions 
will be transmitted to others due to explicit ﬁ nancial linkages across 
institutions.’
Nonetheless it is uncertain to what extent regulators are allowed to 
contain systemic risk. The question is whether and how the ﬁ nancial 
crisis has changed the terms of the traditional approach. 
No longer is it considered sufﬁ cient to concentrate upon the 
monitoring and supervision of only individual institutions or single 
countries, but what is fundamental is the functioning of the system 
as a whole. This reshaping of the relationship between the whole and 
its parts underlines the shift in the cognitive understanding of what 
regulation should aim to achieve. These changes in regulation are 
required ‘to strengthen ﬁ nancial stability and the protection of customers 
so to avoid […] at least a repetition of the extraordinary type of systemic 
breakdown that we are now witnessing’.9
Drawing some lessons from the crises there is a certain consensus 
on the idea that ﬁ nancial markets are of macroeconomic relevance. 
There is less agreement on how to re-design and re-orient regulation 
and supervision towards the global level as the current crisis revealed 
that any centripetal pressure for international harmonization was 
counteracted by centrifugal tendencies10 pushing back towards ‘micro’-
regulation, centred on the relevance of individual choices and towards 
decentralized supervisory measures. 
Prior to the crisis the characteristics and conditions of systemic 
risk had been occasionally questioned but only in the post-crisis 
a characteristic of the market product exerts spill-over effects on individuals or ﬁ rms not 
party to transactions in the marketplace’ [emphasis in original], at pp. 8–10.
8  S.L. Schwarcz, ‘Systemic Risk’, American Law & Economics Association Annual 
Meetings Paper, No. 20/2008, pp. 7 and 19. 
9  The High-level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, chaired by J. de 
Larosière, Report, Brussels 2009, p. 13, point 41.
10  J. Black, ‘Restructuring Global and EU Financial Regulation: Character, 
Capacities and Learning’, p. 8.
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phase did the issue gain relevance. Debates revealed the need for 
macro-prudential policies, then led to analysing which institutions or 
practices are systemically relevant and have ended up by identifying 
the ‘global Systemically Important Financial Institutions’ (SIFIs).11 
The assumption that SIFIs represent a key issue in ﬁ nancial market is 
witnessed by the constant evolution in dealing with this matter by the 
FSB (Financial Stability Board).
As mentioned above, prudential regulation parameters are built 
on the leading idea of economic mainstream that risk can always be 
weighted. Hence, when ﬁ nancial institutions are requested to meet 
precise requirements (in particular capital requirements), the rise of 
systemic risk is presumed to be neutralized once and for all. Regulators 
and policymakers are challenged to change their view on the nature 
and management of risk in the ﬁ nancial system.12 
Restructuring controls means to assure the stability of all ﬁ nancial 
institutions by strengthening the macro-prudential supervision of 
systemic risks. Focusing on an individual bank and/or ﬁ nancial 
institution does not allow for assessment of the risks that can be 
run due to the numerous inter-linking and inter-dependencies 
between the stability of the macro-economy, individual ﬁ nancial 
institutions and the ‘network effect’ of the system as a whole. All in all, 
11  After the crisis the G20 Leaders asked the FSB to develop a policy framework 
to address the systemic and moral hazard risks associated with systemically impor-
tant ﬁ nancial institutions (SIFIs); see: Interim report to G20 leaders ‘Reducing the 
moral hazard posed by systemically important ﬁ nancial institutions’, 18.06.2010. In 
Seoul the G20 Leaders endorsed this framework and the timelines and processes for 
its implementation. Development of the critical policy measures of this framework 
was completed. Implementation of these measures began in 2012. Full implementa-
tion is targeted for 2019. In a document prepared by the FSB, ‘Policy measures to 
address systemically important ﬁ nancial institutions’, 4.11.2011, SIFIs are deﬁ ned 
as ‘ﬁ nancial institutions whose distress or disorderly failure, because of their size, 
complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause signiﬁ cant disruption to the 
wider ﬁ nancial system and economic activity. To avoid this outcome, authorities too 
frequently had no choice but to forestall the failure of such institutions through public 
solvency support. As underscored by this crisis, this has deleterious consequences for 
private incentives and for public ﬁ nances’.
12 The High-level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, chaired by J. de 
Larosière, Report, p. 10, point 23. Furthermore we need to realize that technologies 
of risk management generally used were inadequate. Also, risk models were found 
to be ﬂ awed. An example can be the Value at Risk models that were recognized 
to produce pro-cyclical effects. At the same time, the potential pro-cyclical effect 
of Basel II has also been noted, see: C. Goodhart, ‘Financial Regulation, Credit 
Risk and Financial Stability’, Economic Institute Economic Review, No. 192/2005, 
p. 118. 
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macro-prudential supervision is analogous to oversight of the forest, 
while micro-prudential supervision is analogous to the oversight of 
individual trees.13
In the aftermath of the crisis the prevailing regulatory responses 
did not step out of the path of the prudential approach to ﬁ nancial 
supervision14 whilst in the international landscape some proposals 
arose which were aimed at re-introducing more rigorous rules based 
on the model of structural supervision. 
First of all one must mention the so-called ‘Volker rule’ as part of 
the Dodd-Frank Act which prohibits bank holding companies from 
engaging in proprietary trading and investing in or sponsoring hedge 
funds and private equity operations.15 However, this rule contains 
numerous signiﬁ cant exemptions and, in addition, is scheduled to 
come into effect only in July 2015. 
Secondly, in UK a cornerstone of the ‘Vickers Report’ was its ‘ring-
fencing’ proposal which is maintained in the Banking Reform Act of 
2013 although it has been partially watered down.16
Similar objectives were included in the mandate conferred to the 
High-level Expert Group on reforming the structure of the EU banking 
sector, chaired by Liikanen, Governor of the Finnish Central Bank. 
The Group was required by the EU Commission to pay attention to 
13 As stated in 2009 by the Governor of the Canadian Central Bank. See also: V. Ach-
arya, ‘A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation’, Journal of 
Financial Stability, No. 3/2009, pp. 224–255.
14 First of all we refer here to the Third Basel Accord, agreed upon by the members 
of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision on setting standards on bank capital 
requirements aimed at internalizing the credit risk, a minimum leverage ratio and two 
required liquidity ratios. 
15 The objective of the rule is to prevent ﬁ nancial institutions that beneﬁ t from gov-
ernment-guarantees and taxpayer-backed deposit insurance from using such guaran-
tees and insurance to raise capital and fund proprietary trading activities, see: E.J. Pan, 
‘Understanding Financial Regulation’, Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 329/
April 2011, p. 44.
16 See: ‘The Vickers Report – Final Report – Recommendations’, 12.09.2011. The 
proposed structural separation between domestic retail services and global whole-
sale and investment banking operations represents the most controversial part of 
the report. According to the report, structural separation should make it easier 
and less costly to resolve bank failures and should reduce the inﬂ uence of exter-
nal ﬁ nancial shocks on national retail banking system. See also: The Independent 
Commission on Banking, ‘The Vickers Report & the Parliamentary Commission on 
Banking Standards of 2013’. The Banking Act gives powers, in particular to the 
HM Treasury and the PRA, to implement the recommendations of the Independ-
ent Commission on Banking (ICB) on ring-fencing requirements for the banking 
sector.
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the reforms proposed both in US and in the EU and it launched its 
proposal in October 2012.17
Yet, the idea of going back to a clear-cut split between banking linked 
to traditional and highly-protected ‘narrow banking’, and the so-called 
‘casino ﬁ nance’ has to face numerous and strong criticisms. There 
is no hope of reaching a globally-binding agreement that is needed 
to reintroduce structural supervision. In particular, if such severe 
distinctions were to operate only in some countries but not globally, 
obvious competitive disadvantages would be produced.18
Moreover, the debate launched after the explosion of the ﬁ nancial 
crisis has not yet resulted in generally-shared structural and operational 
reforms. There are still contrasting views on understanding the causes 
of the crisis, as well as on the regulatory responses that can best tackle 
risk and the measures needed to control it. As clearly afﬁ rmed by Julia 
Black, if regulators and economists ‘do not understand how the system 
works, it is very hard to build in mechanisms either for managing risk or 
for ensuring the system’s resilience when those risks crystallize. Whilst 
regulators and others realize a new cognitive framework is needed, they 
are struggling to develop one’.19 
On these premises, at least two important questions arise. The ﬁ rst 
deals with the deﬁ nition of ‘what to regulate’, i.e. the ‘perimeter’ of 
the supervision. With respect to the institutions, controls should be 
extended ‘beyond the three pillars upon which ﬁ nancial regulation 
has traditionally rested’ (i.e. banking, securities and insurance) to 
a broader range of institutions critical to ﬁ nancial stability.20 But are 
17 As a follow-up to the Liikanen report, on 29.01.2014, the EU Commission 
adopted a proposal for a regulation (Proposal for a regulation of the European Par-
liament and of the Council on structural measures improving the resilience of EU 
credit institutions – COM(2014) 043 ﬁ nal to stop the biggest banks from engaging in 
the risky activity of proprietary trading. The new rules would also give supervisors 
the power to require those banks to separate certain potentially risky trading activi-
ties from their deposit-taking business if the pursuit of such activities compromises 
ﬁ nancial stability.
18  See: F. Vella, ‘Il rischio: questo sconosciuto’, Analisi giuridica dell’economia, No. 
1/2009, p. 174.
19  J. Black, ‘Restructuring Global and EU Financial Regulation: Character, Capaci-
ties and Learning’, p. 13.
20  See especially: C.A.E. Goodhart, ‘The Regulatory Response to the Financial Cri-
sis’, CESifo Working Paper, No. 2257/March 2008, p. 13 and R.M. Lastra, ‘Regulatory 
Responses to the Financial Crisis’ in: Financial Crisis Containment and Government 
Guarantees, J.R. LaBrosse, R. Olivares-Caminal and D. Singh (eds.), Cheltenham 2013, 
pp. 76–77 who include in the perimeter ‘institutions such as those involved in the “orig-
inate to distribute” model of credit intermediation, services providers such as clearing 
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these borders to be extended, for instance, to the ‘shadow banking 
system’ encompassing a variety of non-bank ﬁ nancial intermediaries 
engaged in risky activities? Moreover, within the deﬁ ned perimeter, 
an important issue is to deﬁ ne what the best indicators of banking 
and ﬁ nancial soundness are, taking into account that while capital 
regulation could be an important parameter, it is not the only one. 
The second question concerns, on the one hand, the institutional 
architecture of regulation and supervision, especially for systemic risk 
control and, on the other hand, the capability of these institutions 
to implement commonly-shared standards which overcome the 
dichotomy between national law and global markets. Given the 
increasing awareness of systemic risk, there is a broad acceptance of 
the need for an ‘international ﬁ nancial architecture’ able to reshufﬂ e 
the governance of the ﬁ nancial system.21
This paper focuses on the various problems pertaining to the second 
question. First of all, it analyses the organizational realignments 
involving ﬁ nancial institutions and standard-setters at global level. 
The changes concern not only the structure of the global regulators 
and the nature of the interdependencies between them, but also the 
relationships between the global regulators and national regulators 
and governments. They also concern regulatory capacity, which 
is a combination of informational and organizational resources, 
expertise, authority, legitimacy, and accountability. Currently the most 
important change in the structure of global ﬁ nancial regulation has 
been the transformation of the FSF into the FSB and its renewed role 
in global governance as the heads of government in the G20 countries 
realized that national policy responses would be inadequate to stabilize 
ﬁ nancial markets.22 
Secondly, taking into account the main characteristics of the FSB 
as established in the Charter (agreed to in 2009), the FSB has been 
provided with a basis for building its own institutional position within 
and settlement systems, private pools of capitals such as hedge funds and private equity 
funds’. For a deﬁ nition of ﬁ nancial stability, see: G.J. Schinasi, ‘Deﬁ ning Financial Sta-
bility’, IMF Working Paper, No. 04/187, pp. 3–16. 
21 See especially: L. Garicano and R.M. Lastra, ‘Towards a New Architecture for 
Financial Stability: Seven Principles’, Journal of International Economic Law, No. 
3/2010, pp. 599–600.
22 For more on the role of the G20 and the creation of the FSB, see: D.E. Nolle, 
‘Who’s in Charge of Fixing the World’s Financial System? The Un[?]der-Appreciated 
Lead Role of the G20 and the FSB’, SSRN working papers series, draft – January 2014, 
available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2354395 (last visited 
15.05.2014).
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the institutional international environment and has received stronger 
legitimacy as a coordinator. 
After a ﬁ ve-year period in its new role, the ﬁ rst issue at stake is 
whether the FSB is still ‘an arm’ of the G20 or whether it has become 
a ‘fourth pillar’ in the architecture of cooperation established after the 
Second World War.23 Moreover, given the need for a renewed global 
ﬁ nancial architecture, the second point is whether the way forward 
must entail replacement of the loose network-based structure with 
a hierarchical institutional system of control where the FSB could 
become ‘head’ of the global system in cooperation, at least, with the 
European Supervisory Authorities as featured in the EU Regulations 
of 2010.24 
3. The FSB and its mandate for global fi nancial 
    governance
At their Pittsburgh Summit in September 2009, the G2025 leaders 
ofﬁ cially asserted the G20’s status as the ‘premier forum for international 
23  As afﬁ rmed by Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner at the time of the G20 Pittsburgh 
Summit.
24  The Regulations adopted on 24.11.2010 are: Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 es-
tablishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amend-
ing Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC, OJ 
2010 L 331/12; Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 establishing a European Supervisory 
Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), amending De-
cision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/79/EC, OJ 2010 L 
331/48; Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority 
(European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and 
repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC, OJ 2010 L 331/84. For more about ESAs 
see especially: A. Enria and P.G. Texeira, ‘A new institutional Framework for Financial 
Regulation and Supervision’ in: Basel III and Beyond, F. Cannata and M. Quagliariello 
(eds.), London 2012, pp. 16–23.
25  G20 refers commonly to the 19 member countries (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, South Africa, Republic of Korea, Turkey, UK, US) and the European Union 
representative. However, from the time of the establishment by the G7 of the Finance 
Ministers and Central Banks Governors in 1999, the Finance Ministers and Central 
Banks Governors function as the core group. However, since autumn 2008 the Min-
isters and Governors requested the direct participation of the heads of state in taking 
relevant political decisions. Together, G20 member countries accounted for 86% of 
the world GDP in 2012. The G20 is also dominant in ﬁ nancial markets, where they 
accounted for 90% of world banking , 81% of global market capitalization, and 94% of 
global bond markets. See: D.E. Nolle, ‘Who’s in Charge of Fixing the World’s Financial 
System?’, table 1, p. 40.
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cooperation on the most important issues of the global economic and 
ﬁ nancial agenda’, thus assuming ﬁ nancial system leadership. At the 
London Summit in April 2009, the G20 established a new Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) as a successor to the Financial Stability Forum 
(FSF) ‘with a stronger institutional basis and enhanced capacity’.26
Five years on, it seems that the G20, even without supranational 
powers, has functioned well, at least in perspective, managing to enforce 
its agenda through persuasion and peer pressure. The FSB’s mandate 
from G20 leaders included not only coordination of international 
work on ﬁ nancial system reform, but also the responsibility to ‘oversee 
action needed’ to implement the G20 commitments. FSB member 
jurisdictions ‘will lead by example’, through implementation of the 
agreed standards, disclosure, and peer reviews.27
As observed in many comments on the activity of the predecessor 
FSF, its role, though unclear and ambiguous but mainly aimed at 
coordinating the key actors involved in the emerging international 
standard regime28, had weakened over time. The FSF had largely failed 
to realize its potential, as it lacked a clear mandate and allowed large 
countries, in particular the US, to exercise a veto power.29 
The relevant change in the governance of international ﬁ nancial 
standards came with the transformation of the FSF into the FSB.30 
26  Declaration on strengthening the Financial System, London Summit, 2 April 
2009, quoted in the Charter of the Financial Stability Board (agreed in 2009 and re-
cently amended in June 2012), recital (3).
27 The main components of the ﬁ nancial regulatory reform concern: bank capi-
tal; central clearing and trading of OTC derivatives; regulation of rating agencies and 
hedge funds; and bank resolution regimes. As observed by K. Lannoo, ‘The follow-up 
to these commitments has been impressive in the G-20 countries, indicating that G-20 
process effectively worked. The remaining task now is the monitoring of effective imple-
mentation and the exercise of peer pressure’ in: ‘The G-20, ﬁ ve years on’, CEPS Essay, 
No. 9(3)/March 2014.
28 Regarding the deﬁ nition of standards as principles, practices or guidelines in 
a given area and the reason why standards are important, see: http://www.ﬁ nancialsta-
bilityboard.org/cos/standards.htm (last visited 17.07.2014).
29 See: A. Baker, ‘Mandate, Accountability and decision Making Issues to be 
Faced by the FSB’ in: The Financial Stability Board: An Effective Fourth Pillar of Glo-
bal Economic Governance? CIGI Special Report, S. Grifﬁ th-Jones, E. Helleiner and 
N. Woods (eds.), Waterloo 2010, p. 19; E. Helleiner, ‘What role for the New Financial 
Stability Board? The Politics of International Standards after the Crisis’, Global Policy, 
Issue 3/October 2010, p. 283.
30 A more severe judgement contends there is a substantial contrast between the 
FSB and the FSF, since the latter was only ‘a multilateral “think tank” lacking formal 
backing from the major ﬁ nancial centre countries for policy development’, D.E. Nolle, 
‘Who’s in Charge of Fixing the World’s Financial System?’, p. 12.
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Signiﬁ cantly the FSB was given a wider membership (G20 countries, 
Spain and the EU Commission) so that developing countries now have 
a seat at the rule-makers’ table, as well as in some of the standard-
setting bodies, such as IOSCO and the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision.31 According to the FSB’s Charter, ‘the number of seats 
in the Plenary assigned to Member jurisdictions reﬂ ects the size of the 
national economy, ﬁ nancial market activity and national ﬁ nancial 
stability arrangements of the corresponding Member jurisdiction’.32
With respect to the FSB’s Charter it is worth noting that it can 
be, and has been, continuously changed and adapted by the G20, in 
contrast to a formal treaty which, once drafted, is extremely difﬁ cult 
to amend. Actually the G20 leaders refused to establish the FSB as 
a formal international organization based on a multilateral treaty. The 
FSB’s Charter remains ‘a work in progress’. It has been changed several 
times and G20 countries may continue to add new tasks to the list of 
FSB responsibilities.
The FSB’s Charter establishes the FSB as the ‘regime manager’ for 
the G-20 and deﬁ nes the basis whereby FSB builds its own institutional 
role within the international architecture. It gives the FSB greater 
legitimacy as coordinator and as standard-setter, at least for the G-20 
countries. 
The membership of the FSB was a political decision taken in the 
darkest days of the crisis and it may be said that it was not the result 
31 What is relevant about the membership of the FSB is the diversity of bodies 
represented, which includes a range of inﬂ uential non-state actors. The FSB includes 
three types of members. The ﬁ rst type of membership is the ‘member jurisdictions’. 
The reference to ‘jurisdictions’ and not ‘states’ allows the participation of bodies such 
as the ECB and European Commission in this list. Moreover, it is not strictly the states 
that are represented, but the relevant authorities responsible for ﬁ nancial stability 
in that jurisdiction. The second category of member is comprised of the Internation-
al Financial Institutions: the BIS, IMF, Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and the IBRD. The third type of membership is comprised of 
International Standard-Setting, Regulatory, Supervisory and Central Bank Bodies. 
These currently include the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), 
IOSCO, the Basel Committee, Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), 
Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS) and the IASB. New members could 
be included in the future. Article 5(2) of the Charter states that ‘the eligibility of Mem-
bers will be reviewed periodically by the Plenary in the light of the FSB objectives’, im-
plying that members may be excluded or removed from the FSB.
32  Article 11 and Annex A, Charter of the Financial Stability Board 2009 (June 
2012), containing the list of member jurisdictions and the allocation of the seats. The 
FSB membership extends to the major international ﬁ nancial institutions, including 
the IMF and the WB, and the international standard setting bodies (SSBs).
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of a careful examination of reasonable criteria for membership. As 
a consequence, not all the countries that are of ﬁ nancial systemic 
relevance are members of the FSB. Nonetheless, as one of FSB’s 
principal issues is the impact of each jurisdiction on the stability of 
the global ﬁ nancial system, the FSB is paying increasing attention 
to the ways of fostering interaction between FSB members and 
non-members, in particular establishing Regional Consultative Groups 
and promoting compliance with international standards among non-
member countries.
Since its renovation the FSB has become a standard-setter itself 
and in its ﬁ rst year issued some sets of Principles (for Cross-border 
Cooperation on Crisis Management; Sound Compensation Practices 
and its Implementation Standards). Along with this development of its 
functions, of greater signiﬁ cance may be the fact that the principles can 
be seen not only as regulatory tools aimed at affecting behaviour, but 
they can also have a ‘symbolic signiﬁ cance’ as they can contribute to 
deﬁ ne the issuer’s role in the regulatory regime. They address not only 
the market actors in order to regulate their behaviour, but also national 
regulators in the broadest sense. Lastly, by focusing on implementation 
they are benchmarks that are being used to assess national regulatory 
regimes. Consequently, ‘the development of the FSB’s role as standard-
setter is a step towards establishing its position as overall coordinator, 
manager, and enforcer of the international regulatory regime’.33
As it is well known by regulators, setting principles and/or rules is 
only the ﬁ rst part of their work. How and to what extent they are complied 
with is a cornerstone in regulatory procedures. Various mechanisms 
are already in place for monitoring the implementation of international 
ﬁ nancial standards and for reviewing their effectiveness.34
First of all, the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) 
represents an independent assessment of compliance with international 
ﬁ nancial standards. The origin of this mechanism goes back to the 
time when FSF was created and the IMF and World Bank established 
33 J. Black, ‘Restructuring Global and EU Financial Regulation’, p. 22, and see fur-
ther: J. Black, ‘The Rise, Fall and Fate of Principles Based Regulation’ in: Law Reform 
and Financial Markets, K. Alexander and N. Moloney (eds.), Cheltenham 2011.
34  As mentioned in the FSB ‘A Coordination Framework for Monitoring the Im-
plementation of Agreed G20/FSB Financial Reforms’, 18.10.2011, such mechanisms 
include the IMF-World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) and Reports 
on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) assessments; FSB thematic and 
country peer reviews and progress reports; and monitoring and review processes car-
ried out by SSBs.
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the FSAP to evaluate compliance of member countries with the 
international ﬁ nancial standards (the twelve prioritized standards) 
that the FSF sought to promote worldwide. 
With regard to the FSAP, the distrust of some developing countries 
towards the international standards regime led to the decision to make 
this process voluntary and to allow governments to block the publication 
of results. In a like manner developing countries also requested that 
participation be voluntary in the preparation of the IMF’s Reports on 
the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC). One reason for this 
wariness towards the international standards regime could have been 
their low representation in the FSF and in the international standard-
setting bodies. Undoubtedly some of these bodies were dominated by 
advanced industrial countries and the adequacy of the standards for 
developing countries was often questioned.35 
Unlike the previous conditions, the FSB imposes an obligation on 
members to implement the main international ﬁ nancial standards 
as well as the standards established by the FSB on its own initiative, 
while FSB members have agreed to undergo an assessment under the 
FSAP review process every ﬁ ve years and to make the Reports public. 
Promoting compliance through such an instrument, the focus of 
the FSB has been on jurisdictions that could pose risks to ﬁ nancial 
stability because of their position in the ﬁ nancial system and their low 
compliance with the relevant standards. 
The peer review system set up by FSB includes not only the 
FSAP as a country-based review to ensure the implementation of 
recommendations in the G20 member jurisdictions, but also reviews 
on a thematic basis to monitor compliance with the FSB’s standards.36 
As stated in a FSB document, ‘the added value’ of peer reviews will 
come ‘from the cross-sector, cross-functional, system-wide perspective 
brought by its members’. Moreover ‘dialogue with peers will be a key 
beneﬁ t’.37 In the context of this cooperative dialogue with regulators 
35  E. Helleiner, ‘What Role for the New Financial Stability Board?’, p. 283 who 
summarizes the tensions between different sorts of countries and within the stand-
ard setting bodies, on the basis of many studies of political scientists quoted in the 
paper.
36  See, e.g. Thematic Reviews on Compensation (2010 and 2011); on Risk Gov-
ernance (2013); on FSB Principles for Reducing reliance on CRA ratings (2013 and 
2014).
37 FSB, ‘Framework for Strengthening Adherence to International Standards’, 
9.01.2010, p. 2. ‘The dialogue with jurisdictions has four purposes: – to examine a juris-
diction’s compliance against international supervisory and regulatory standards relat-
ing to cooperation and information exchange; – to examine the reasons for shortcomings 
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and ﬁ nancial supervisors of the countries involved, the role of peer 
reviews could be considered twofold: providing technical assistance 
and ensuring compliance. As underlined by many commentators, the 
FSB’s attitude is tending towards the latter.
However the FSB has no direct means to either promote or enforce 
compliance, and the practical consequences of non-compliance remain 
unclear and ambiguous. Nonetheless it is developing a ‘toolbox’ 
composed, on the one hand, of some ‘positive’ measures aimed at 
providing advice and technical assistance and, on the other, in case 
of insufﬁ cient compliance, of ‘negative’ measures such as signing 
multilateral Memoranda of Understanding so that standard-setting 
bodies can assist them in achieving a greater adherence.38 Hence 
pressure on non-cooperative jurisdictions has been encouraged by the 
G20 leaders.
While the priority objective and the ambition of the FSB is to 
promote worldwide compliance with regulatory and supervisory 
standards on international cooperation and information exchange, the 
focus is ‘on the adherence of the FSB members and other jurisdictions 
that rank highly in ﬁ nancial importance’.39 In this regard the FSB’s 
in adherence; – to discuss the jurisdiction’s progress in meeting the relevant recom-
mendations set out in any ROSC; and to make recommendations on steps to improve 
compliance. The FSB will form an expert team to examine all relevant, existing informa-
tion, including information provided by the authorities on developments since the latest 
IMF-World Bank ROSC. The expert team will be composed of specialists in banking, 
insurance and securities regulation and supervision as appropriate. The expert team 
will engage in dialogue with the jurisdiction and, if needed, encourage the authorities to 
request a new assessment of compliance from the IMF/World Bank, either through a Fi-
nancial Sector Assessment Programme assessment or through stand-alone ROSCs’, FSB, 
‘Promoting Global Adherence to International Cooperation and Information Exchange 
Standards’, 10.03.2010, p. 2.
38  FSB, ‘Promoting Global Adherence to International Cooperation and Informa-
tion Exchange Standards’, pp. 3, 11–12 and Annex D: ‘Toolbox of possible measures 
to promote the implementation of international ﬁ nancial standards’. In November 
2011 the FSB published a list, available at: http://www.ﬁ nancialstabilityboard.org/
publications/r_111102.pdf (last visited 17.07.2014) of all jurisdictions evaluated to 
recognise the progress that most jurisdictions evaluated by the FSB under the current 
initiative have made towards implementing international cooperation and informa-
tion exchange standards, and to incentivise improvements by those jurisdictions not 
fully cooperating, see: ‘Status update – 2 November 2012’.
39 ‘The FSB prioritised a pool of about 60 jurisdictions for evaluation, including all 
24 FSB member jurisdictions together with non-FSB jurisdictions that rank highly based 
on a combination of economic and ﬁ nancial indicators. (The ranking process is described 
in more detail in Annex B of the November 2011 statement)’, see: ‘Global Adherence to 
Regulatory and Supervisory Standards on International Cooperation and Information 
Exchange – Status Update – 18 December 2013’, p. 2. 
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Charter includes provisions for non-member countries to take part in 
its working groups, standing committees and plenary meetings.40 
In addition it is afﬁ rmed that the FSB should consult widely with 
non-members ‘in the development of the FSB’s medium- and long-
term strategic plans, principles, standards and guidance’, and that ‘[t]
his process shall include engaging with the FSB Regional Consultative 
Groups and include an outreach to countries not included in the Regional 
Consultative Groups’.41 
Regarding the need to develop ‘a more ambitious mechanism to 
provide voice for non-members’, a number of proposals have come 
up over time. Formerly the ‘de Larosière report’ suggested, in 2009, 
that in view of the high role proposed for the FSF (‘promoting the 
convergence of international ﬁ nancial regulation to the highest level 
benchmarks’ along with international standard setters), the FSF had 
to include all systemically important countries and to report to the 
IMF’s International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC)42. Later 
it was stated that a reasonable solution would be to make the FSB 
accountable not to the forum of the G20 leaders but to a more universal 
body such as the IMF. This proposal followed a previous one aimed at 
opening the membership of an FSB-like body to all IMF and World 
Bank members.43
At the moment the FSB reports to the G20 leaders. This accountability 
to the leaders of the most powerful states in the world provides the 
FSB with greater relevance in global economic governance. However 
its future relies strictly on the role and the cohesion of the G20 and on 
its legitimacy vis-à-vis non-G20 countries in the long term. 
This relationship between the G20 and FSB can be linked to 
a model of accountability, i.e. horizontal accountability, prevailing in 
the global system where the legitimacy of transnational regulators can 
be enhanced when they are able to report to other bodies acting in the 
same global space. In addition accountability can also be fostered when 
a wide range of stakeholders are increasingly involved and participate 
40 ‘The Chair can extend, after consultation with Members, ad-hoc invitations to 
representatives of non-FSB Members to attend the whole or part of the Plenary Meet-
ings’, FSB Charter, Article 10(3).
41 FSB Charter, Article 3.
42 The High-level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, chaired by J. de 
Larosière, Report, Recommendation 25, p. 61.
43 For the ﬁ rst proposal, see: E. Helleiner, ‘The Financial Stability Board and In-
ternational Standards’, CIGI G20 Papers, No. 1/June 2010, p. 7; and for the second, 
see: Department of Finance, Government of Canada, International Supervisory and 
Surveillance Initiative, 1998, as quoted in E. Helleiner.
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actively in the procedures and decision-making of transnational 
institutions.44
While FSB needed to increase its legitimacy by providing a wider 
representation in its deliberations, the Charter allows for consultation 
‘with other stakeholders including private sector’ as well as non-member 
authorities. Moreover it notes that ‘in the context of speciﬁ c sessions of 
the Plenary, the Chair can also invite, after consultation with Members, 
representatives of the private sector’.45
No doubt global regulators are seeking to enable all the stakeholders 
acting in the ﬁ nancial system to have their voice heard in ‘standard-
making’ procedures, although at a different level and in different 
roles. However in this context the FSB needs to develop transparent 
procedures and to give ‘societal interests’ a better representation in 
the international regulatory structure. Otherwise the provisions of 
the Charter can be criticized on the assumption that FSB can act in 
favour of the ‘private sector’, and can run or could have run the risk 
of being ‘captured’ by private groups and interests.46 Having regard 
to the conditions foreseen by other regulators to reduce the inﬂ uence 
of the public sector, the FSB should also minimize the problem 
of ‘revolving doors’ and, with regard to consultations, should 
develop procedures where the private sector can be represented and 
heard.47
44  It is worth noting that accountability is a concept of a multifaceted and complex 
nature, and there is also great confusion about its relationship with independence. 
It has been stated that ‘properly-designed accountability mechanisms keep an inde-
pendent supervisory agency “under control” but do not directly control its policies and 
practices’. Thus ‘a crucial factor in the global ﬁ nancial crisis was that weak public over-
sight of ﬁ nancial regulators and supervisors had allowed those guardians to design and 
maintain policies that favoured the ﬁ nancial sector in the short term but which were 
ultimately highly destabilizing’, E. Ferran, ‘Institutional Design for Financial Market 
Supervision: The Choice for National Systems’, p. 16.
45  FSB Charter, Articles 3(1) and 10(3).
46 See, especially: E. Helleiner and T. Porter, ‘Making Transnational Networks More 
Accountable’ in: Re-deﬁ ning the Global Economy, S. Burke (ed.), Friedrich Ebert Stif-
tung Occasional Paper, No. 42/2009, p. 14; A. Baker, ‘Restraining Regulatory Capture? 
Crisis Politics and Trajectories of Change in Global Financial Governance’, Interna-
tional Affairs, Vol. 86(3)/2010, p. 647.
47 Macro-prudential regulation requires regulators to take a strong stance against 
market trends, such as cyclical booms or growing concentration and risk taking within 
the ﬁ nancial system. If regulators’ relationships with private market actors are too cosy, 
this role cannot be performed well’, E. Helleiner, ‘The Financial Stability Board and 
International Standards’, p. 16.
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4. What role could the FSB play to ensure stability 
    in the global fi nancial system?
The FSB was established as ‘coordinator’ of standard-setting bodies 
and, in a different perspective, as ‘network’ of regulators. 
It is a widely-held opinion that the lack of international coordination 
in regulation was at the heart of the ﬁ nancial crisis. Hence the idea 
of strengthening cooperation between national regulators has been 
seen as part of the policy response, including by means of existing 
networks responsible for international regulatory standard-setting. In 
recent decades, ‘policy networks’48 have represented the new form of 
cooperation and coordination that nationally-based regulatory agencies 
have used to adapt to the tendencies of the global ﬁ nancial system, 
including the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the 
International Accounting Standard Board (IASB), and the International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). Regulators have tried to 
achieve convergence on minimum standards by means of ‘soft law’ 
and to ensure compliance by sharing information and best practices as 
well as moral suasion.49
In this perspective the FSF, created with a pragmatic approach 
toward gradually redesigning the international ﬁ nancial architecture, 
initially played the role of coordinator of rules issued by other bodies. 
An important FSF initiative was to collect international standards 
relevant for the stability and correct functioning of ﬁ nancial systems 
in the Compendium of Standards.50 
The G20 response to the crisis has placed the FSB at the centre 
of intensiﬁ ed regulatory cooperation. As illustrated in part 2 of this 
paper, the FSB has played a key role in developing global ﬁ nancial 
regulation not limited to constantly monitoring the evolution of 
48  For a deﬁ nition of this term, see, above all: A.M. Slaughter, A New Global Order, 
Princeton 2004.
49 With respect to the FSB as ‘a soft law system’, see: D.W. Arner and M.W. Taylor, 
‘The Global Financial Crisis and the Financial Stability Board: Hardening the Soft 
Law of International Financial Regulation?’, AIIFL Working Paper, No. 6/June 2009, 
p. 14. For a more general discussion on the role of soft law in the ﬁ nancial system, 
see: Ch. Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System. Rule Making in the 21st 
Century, Cambridge 2012.
50 The rules collected in the Compendium are partially produced by the bodies that 
are members of the FSF/FSB, and partially by other organizations. Currently this also 
represents a tool for coordinating numerous bodies involved in ﬁ nancial governance 
and for widening the perimeter of the FSB coordination activity.
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ﬁ nancial markets and coordinating some other standard setters. 
Instead, unlike its predecessor, it has promoted, on the one hand, 
principles and guidelines on its own initiative and assumed the role 
of standard setter, and on the other hand has improved compliance by 
means of peer review procedures. 
Furthermore it has assumed the role of linking the G20 and the 
standard-setting bodies, implementing guidance proposed by the 
former and coordinating the activities of the latter. As for the interaction 
between the G20 and the FSB, the Board has not only increasingly 
formulated priorities for the reform of ﬁ nancial regulation but has 
also extended the perimeter of its own activities by establishing 
principles and new tools aimed at promoting the implementation of 
standards in national orders. As for the relationships between the 
FSB and standard setters, the new mandate foresees periodic reviews 
aimed at ensuring that these bodies respect the established priorities. 
The Coordination Framework (2011) makes it clear that the limits of 
the FBS’s role as coordinator of the international regulatory regime 
are well-deﬁ ned. Over its early initial years the FSB has been able to 
reinforce its position as central coordinator, but only within the G20 
mandate.51
At the heart of this post-crisis reform there is also a renewed 
cooperation among governments strengthened by the mechanism of 
the G20 summits and the role of the FSB as an ‘umbrella-organisation’ 
responsible for ongoing coordination of governments, national ﬁ nancial 
regulators, transnational bodies and networks in order to manage 
macro-prudential oversight and surveillance on systemic risk.52
The innovations introduced into the international ﬁ nancial 
architecture do not provide a radical alternative to the pre-existing 
structure. All in all, the new architecture of the ﬁ nancial system 
is only an evolution of the previous one since the most relevant 
characteristics have been maintained such as the option for soft 
law and non-binding mechanisms of cooperation and coordination, 
51 ‘The motivation for having such a framework is ultimately to ensure that the 
agreed G20/FSB ﬁ nancial reforms are effectively implemented and have the intended 
results on global ﬁ nancial stability. Given its mandate and its diverse membership, 
the FSB is well-positioned to assess the overall coherence and consistency of imple-
mentation efforts across its members and to alert relevant bodies of any signiﬁ cant 
impediments or unintended consequences to implementation’, FSB, ‘A Coordination 
Framework for Monitoring the Implementation of Agreed G20/FSB Financial Re-
form’, 18.10.2011, p. 3.
52 A. Enria and P.G. Teixeira, ‘A new institutional framework for ﬁ nancial regulation 
and supervision’, p. 13.
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the traditional balancing between national and international levels, 
and the lack of supranational powers.
Nonetheless, at the Los Cabos Summit (June 2012) the G20 took 
the decision to gradually give the FSB more formal autonomy and 
established the Board ‘on an enduring organisation footing, with legal 
personality, strengthened governance, greater ﬁ nancial autonomy and 
enhanced capacity to coordinate the development and implementation 
of ﬁ nancial regulatory policies, while maintaining strong links with 
the BIS’53 (the FSB is still hosted by the BIS in Basel). The FSB has 
now been established as an association under Article 60 of the Swiss 
Civil Code. The FSB Plenary approved the Articles of Association in 
January 2013, although the FSB Charter is still the primary document 
governing the FSB’s activities and decision-making. 
This innovation has seen the FSB slowly transformed from a loose 
and informal network into a more structured organization. However 
it is uncertain whether the FSB will become an even more permanent 
and enduring body, since the FSB Articles of Association are binding 
only under Swiss law. At the international level the Charter remains 
a non-binding agreement between FSB members. No doubt the FSB’s 
informal structure is in contrast with the other pillars such as the IMF, 
WB and WTO, which are based on international treaties and enjoy 
legal personality.
As often recalled, the re-design of the regulatory framework in 
the wake of the crisis was deeply debated. Following the initial 
set of reforms, aimed at deﬁ ning a more strict distinction between 
micro- and macro-prudential supervision and establishing new 
bodies such as the European Systemic Risk Board,54 or redeﬁ ning 
pre-existing bodies as in the case of FSB, the debate about reshaping 
the governance of the ﬁ nancial sector, especially at EU and global 
levels, hasn’t been so widespread and intense, perhaps owing to an 
assumption that the present ﬁ nancial system could be improved only 
a little if at all. 
However rethinking the organizational structure can lead the 
discussion to focus on a key question, i.e. what is the most appropriate 
criterion in the ﬁ nancial sphere for managing a set of regulatory actors, 
their relationships and their behaviour within a complex and dynamic 
system?
53 G20 Leaders declaration, Los Cabos, Mexico, 19.06.2012.
54 Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight 
of the ﬁ nancial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board, OJ 2010 
L 331/1.
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The future of the architecture of ﬁ nancial stability depends on the 
choice between two opposite modes of organizing supervision: whether 
through a hierarchical organization or by promoting coordination in 
a loose and complex network structure of a multiplicity of different 
ﬁ nancial bodies and international ‘fora’. 
In the view of some commentators, given the rise in systemic risks 
and the characteristics of the current ﬁ nancial system, the way forward 
must involve ‘the substitution of this loose network with a hierarchical 
structure more akin to the one used in the WTO’, since ‘the evolution of the 
ﬁ nancial system requires the creation of a new multilateral ﬁ nancial body 
with authority to settle disputes and to impose its decisions’.55 This model 
has been the basis for proposals to add the FSB as a ‘fourth pillar’ to the 
architecture of cooperation established after the Second World War. 
If the FSB were to move to the WTO model, some new mechanisms 
would have to be established. Firstly, in the case of non-compliance 
by member countries, the membership obligations should be enforced 
by putting in place a more forceful approach similar to the WTO’s 
dispute settlement mechanism. However member countries might not 
accept such an enhanced power of the FSB and their commitments to 
international standards, since the new FSB’s membership rules remain 
non-binding in a legal sense, based on the declaration of the FSB 
Charter that it is ‘not intended to create any legal rights or obligations’. 
Secondly, the alternative of a more structured and hierarchical 
institution would mean that international prudential standards must be 
harmonized on a worldwide basis, including the rulebooks of national 
regulators. Achieving harmonization is a highly problematic objective 
because the FSB’s decision-making body, the Plenary, is composed of 
all the members, and operates on the consensus principle. As long as 
the priority task for the FSB is to develop appropriate international 
standards and to create consensus on their content, there is the risk 
that achieving consensus may become more difﬁ cult if there were an 
increased number of countries in the decision-making bodies. 
The problem with decision-making based on consensus is that it 
provides any member state with a right of veto. The enlargement of 
FSB membership and the participation in decision making of different 
types of countries (i.e. developed, developing, systemically signiﬁ cant 
55 L. Garicano and R.M. Lastra, ‘Towards a New Architecture for Financial Stabil-
ity: Seven Principles’, Journal of International Economic Law, No. 3/2010, p. 619. In-
stead of proposing a newly revised FSB, the authors suggest that the IMF would be ‘the 
institution best placed to adopt the role of “global sheriff” with regard to international 
ﬁ nancial stability’.
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and not) could inﬂ uence the standard-setting process.56 The FSB may 
be unable to maintain global ﬁ nancial stability and promote standards 
harmonization in the G20 member countries, much less able to do 
so in the non-G20 countries. Extending the perimeter of its inﬂ uence 
would mean that the FSB must adjust the basis of its legitimacy and 
reduce or even eliminate its reliance on the G20 mandate.
As emphasized above, the FSB has sought to expand its base of 
legitimacy by means of promoting consultation beyond the G20 
countries and fostering the role of the Regional Consultative Groups. 
However, FSB members may fear ‘that giving greater autonomy to the 
FSB would risk the body moving away from its core role of coordination 
and oversight into a more “regulatory” role’. Therefore it is hard not to 
agree with the opinion that ‘in the ﬁ eld of ﬁ nancial regulation, there 
is deﬁ nitely no desire at present to move towards a body operating in 
a fashion similar to the other pillars’ such as WTO and IMF.57
Undoubtedly such a development would represent, compared to the 
current institutional structure, a radical change whereby new global 
supervisors would operate independently of their governments and 
would gain a superior position vis-à-vis networks of national authorities, 
and in addition be granted their own enforcement and compliance 
powers. Any reform proposal moving to such a hierarchical authority 
for the ﬁ nancial system appears highly unlikely inasmuch as states 
everywhere do not wish to create independent global institutions and 
to provide them with supranational powers. 
Unlike these calls for a more hierarchical architecture for the ﬁ nancial 
system, there are also numerous opinions recognizing that the choice of 
a form of ‘informal’ governance based on intergovernmentalism instead of 
the formal institutional form represented by the IMF and WTO, follows 
a trend in global governance towards looser networks and cooperation.58 
56 The participation of developing counties in rule-making ‘must translate into real 
inﬂ uence […]. In this respect it is discouraging that the new steering committee and all 
three of the new standing committees were chaired initially by ofﬁ cials from developed 
countries’, E. Helleiner,‘What role for the New Financial Stability Board?’, p. 287. 
57 J. Wouters and J. Odermatt, ‘Comparing the “Four Pillars” of Global Economic 
Governance: A Critical Analysis of the Institutional design of the FSB, IMF, World 
Bank and WTO’, Leuven Center for Global Governance Studies Working Paper, No. 128/
December 2013, p. 14.
58 ‘The “horizontal” approach of intergovernmental co-operation (through the “Gs” and 
the standard setting bodies) was preferred over an institutional “vertical” approach (in-
volving an international organization such as the IMF to head the process)’ as afﬁ rmed 
by M. Giovanoli, ‘The Reform of International Financial Architecture After the Global 
Crisis’, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, No. 81/2009, p. 90. 
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Although some criticism for the FSB’s informality can be heard 
here and there, it is broadly agreed that the lack of formal decision-
making and voting procedures makes it easier to converge on certain 
issues. Ensuring ﬁ nancial stability is a duty of member authorities and 
central banks and it may be more efﬁ ciently attained by monitoring 
and supervisory mechanisms, establishing guidelines and exchanging 
best practices rather than through legal and enforceable measures. 
The FSB report to the G20 at the Los Cabos Summit focused on 
‘ﬂ exibility’ as one of its strengths and afﬁ rmed that ‘the FSB should 
remain a ﬂ exible, responsive, member-driven, multi-institutional and 
multidisciplinary institution’, and that it ‘considers a treaty-based 
inter-governmental organisation not to be an appropriate legal form at 
this juncture’.59 
Furthermore the FSB has no power of implementation and enforce-
ment of binding commitments, but rather resorts to different tools to 
ensure compliance such as monitoring and peer review. As observed 
above, the FSB seeks to achieve these tasks with the help of more pow-
erful international bodies such as the IMF and World Bank. 
Organizations working in the ﬁ nancial regulatory space have reached 
a certain degree of supervisory cooperation at the global level and especially 
in the ﬁ eld of global ﬁ nancial stability are engaged in cooperation like that 
between the FSB and the IMF for macro-prudential oversight. 
As stated in the Charter, the FSB will ‘collaborate with IMF to conduct 
Early Warning Exercises’60 that are intended to improve the analysis of 
systemic risks.61 In this jointly-carried-out activity, we can see a sort of 
In addition, see: J. Wouters and J. Odermatt, ‘Comparing the “Four Pillars” of Global Eco-
nomic Governance’, pp. 14, 21; D. Zaring, ‘Finding Legal Principles in Global Financial 
Regulation’, Virginia Journal of International Law, No. 3/2012, p. 713; E.J. Pan, ‘Challenge 
of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in Financial Supervision: Beyond 
Transgovernmental Networks’, Chicago Journal of International Law, No. 11/2010, p. 243.
59 FSB, report to the G20 Los Cabos Summit on Strengthening FSB capacity, re-
sources and governance, 18-19.06.2012, points 1 and 11, available at: http://fsbwatch.
org/news/146-fsb-reports-to-the-g20-los-cabos-summit (last visited 19.07.2014).
60 FSB Charter, Article 2(1). See also: A. Enria and P.G. Teixeira, ‘A new institutional 
framework for ﬁ nancial regulation and supervision’, p. 14, with regard to the ﬁ ve main 
layers involving the cooperation between the FSB and the other global ﬁ nancial bodies 
in the process for achieving regulatory repair and supervisory convergence.
61  One the G20’s ﬁ rst reactions to the crisis was to task the IMF and FSB with 
establishing a joint Early Warning Exercise (EWE). As the EWE has evolved through 
multiple iterations, several guiding principles and modalities have evolved: – the key 
output of the EWE is a conﬁ dential presentation of risks and vulnerabilities to the 
International Monetary and Financial Committee(IMFC); – to facilitate cooperation, the 
IMF and the FSB take non-exclusive leading roles in their areas of comparative strength. 
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‘division of powers and responsibilities’, whereby the IMF is responsible 
for economic and macro-prudential risk analysis and the FSB has greater 
responsibility with respect to regulatory and supervisory issues.
The FSB has had a direct role in the formulation of policies concerning 
cross-border systemic matters. One of the main examples is that of addressing 
the risks associated with systemically important ﬁ nancial institutions 
(SIFIs). The FSB promoted the creation of supervisory colleges and developed 
a policy framework for SIFIs in cooperation with standard setting bodies.62 
Moreover, the FSB has taken into account other pressing issues for the 
global economy, such as ending the ‘Too Big-To-Fail’ institutions,63 reform of 
OTC derivatives64 and shortcomingsin the ﬁ nancial system.65 
The IMF has led the work on macroeconomic and macro-ﬁ nancial vulnerabilities, 
while the FSB has taken the lead on vulnerabilities and regulatory challenges in the 
ﬁ nancial sector; – the EWE combines rigorous empirical analysis with surveys of experts 
and market intelligence. The ﬁ ndings of the EWE are steeped in extensive empirical 
research, aiming for a thorough quantitative analysis of vulnerabilities by drawing 
on a large number of empirical tools. The EWE does not aim to predict the timing of 
crises. Indeed, as the global crisis unfolded, the EWE has increasingly focused on the 
repercussions of risks that may have already materialized. For a complete description 
of the EWE’s procedures and activities, see: IMF, ‘The IMF-FSB Early warning Exercise’ 
Design and Methodological Toolkit, September 2010.
62 See FSB, FSB Report on Reducing the moral hazard posed by systemically im-
portant ﬁ nancial institutions, October 2010; and ‘Intensity and Effectiveness of SIFI-
Supervision’ – Recommendations on enhanced supervision, November 2010, both 
available at: http://www.ﬁ nancialstabilityboard.org/list/fsb_publications/tid_165/in-
dex.htm (last visited 17.07.2014).
63  See FSB, ‘Progress and Next Steps Towards Ending “Too-Big-To-Fail” (TBTF)’, 
Report of the FSB to the G-20, 2.09.2013. ‘[The SIFI] framework [endorsed by the G-20 
leaders at the Seoul Summit in 2010] addresses the TBTF issue by reducing the prob-
ability and impact of SIFIs failing. It comprises requirements for assessing the systemic 
importance of institutions, for additional loss absorbency, for increased supervisory 
intensity, for more effective resolution mechanisms, and for stronger ﬁ nancial market 
infrastructure’. The G-20 leaders were given advice to renew their commitments to 
address TBTF especially in six areas: 1) legislative reform; 2) removing obstacles to 
cross-border resolution; 3) improving the resolvability of ﬁ rms’ structures and opera-
tions; 4) considering domestic structural measures that are complementary to en ef-
fective SIFI Framework; 5) implementing policy measures for domestic systematically 
banks (D-SIBs); 6) removing obstacles to supervisory effectiveness.
64  See the FSB’s last document: ‘OTC Derivatives Market reforms’ Seventh Progress 
Report on Implementation, 8.04.2014, where it is afﬁ rmed that ‘Key international poli-
cy standards have been ﬁ nalised in most commitment areas and work on the remaining 
standards is on track to be ﬁ nalised by the November 2014 G20 Leaders Summit. Most 
jurisdictions have completed necessary reforms to legislative frameworks and are devel-
oping or bringing into force detailed rules where required’.
65  See the Letter of the FSB’s Chairman to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Banks 
Governors, 4.04.2014, on the priorities for completing reforms by the Brisbane Summit. 
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5. The way forward
Given the important role played by the FSB in global economic 
governance after the crisis, its informal structure could be considered 
as no longer adequate to attain the necessary level of inﬂ uence in the 
global economy. Nonetheless, it needs to be noted that even in latest 
point of view of the FSB and its Plenary there is little support for 
‘moving to a constituency-based membership’ and making ‘discussion 
more rigid’, and it considers ‘the current number of 70 members as the 
upper limit consistent’ with both effectiveness and representativeness. 
Moreover, it noted that ‘members agree to use the ﬂ exibility that exists 
within the FSB’s rules to enable relevant authorities within jurisdictions 
to participate in, or be informed of, the policy work that takes place in 
the FSB’s standing committees and working groups’.66 
The FSB emphasizes its role as ‘coordinator’ and argues that it is not 
the appropriate body to work with a rigid institutional structure and 
formal decision making since it was established to coordinate other 
important actors involved in ensuring ﬁ nancial stability, and not to 
harmonize or impose international legal rules.67
Coordination is a difﬁ cult challenge and especially after the crisis 
possible ways forward, sometimes based on opposite premises, have 
emerged. Here we can refer to some different approaches. 
Firstly, as the G20 has intensiﬁ ed the effort for a stronger international 
standards regime, some critics have contested the feasibility of the so-
called ‘one-size-ﬁ ts-all’ global standards model, arguing that a more 
effective strategy might be to promote core principles and enhance 
coordination only at the level of broad principles. One further beneﬁ t 
of principle-based vis-à-vis rule-based regulatory cooperation is that it 
might mitigate or thwart the possible increase in ﬁ nancial instability if 
the rules are of low quality and/or not appropriate.68 
66  Letter of the FSB’s Chairman to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Banks Gov-
ernors, 4.04.2014, on the priorities for completing reforms by the Brisbane Summit, 
p. 4.
67  See J. Wouters and J. Odermatt, ‘Comparing the “Four Pillars” of Global Eco-
nomic Governance’, p. 22. 
68  Some analysts maintain that detailed harmonized international rules are too 
inﬂ exible and may increase instability. So they argue that a more principles-based 
approach might be not only politically realistic but also desirable. For this perspec-
tive see, e.g. D. Rodrik, ‘A Plan B for Global Finance’, The Economist, 12.03.2009; 
Warwick Commission Report, ‘The Warwick Commission on International Financial 
Reform: In Praise of Unlevel Playing Fields’, University of Warwick 2009, available at: 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/research/warwickcommission/ﬁ nancialreform/report/ (last 
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Secondly, some analysts, as illustrated above, have advocated the 
enhancing of hard law commitments and enforcement and creation 
of a ‘ﬁ nancial WTO’ or of a single ‘world ﬁ nancial regulator’. But 
currently such a development at the global level is unlikely politically. 
In a polycentric regime where there is wide dispersion of authority 
among numerous ﬁ nancial institutions and regulators, the FSB has to 
face many challenges if it attempts to gain the position of ‘hierarchical 
leader’. In many respects the FSB is cooperating/competing with some 
of its own members as standard setter and often as the ‘watch-dog’ 
of implementation and it is interacting with national governments 
that are unwilling to transfer sovereignty to international bodies or to 
accept common standards or modes of supervision.69
Considering, as assumed in part 1 of this paper, that systemic risk 
focuses on risks to the ﬁ nancial system, the main goal of regulating/
preventing systemic risks is to preserve stability of the ﬁ nancial 
system, since this would prevent a breakdown that could impact on 
national economic security and generate high social costs.70 Because of 
the common element involved in systemic risks, sometimes referred to 
as ‘the domino effect’, protecting ﬁ nancial stability calls for fostering 
macro-prudential oversight by gathering and analysing information, 
reducing fragmentation of responsibility for macro-prudential analysis, 
issuing warnings and recommendations, and monitoring compliance. 
The question is whether the architecture of the international 
ﬁ nancial system needs to be revised, and if so, how? After the crisis 
we are more and more aware that managing global ﬁ nancial markets 
makes contradictory demands concerning organizational design.
Another question often raised is whether the FSB, in its various roles 
as coordinator, standard-setter and monitor, is able to prevent systemic 
risks. First of all, the FSB works within the current soft law framework 
and lacks legal power to impose implementation upon recalcitrant 
members. Second, the legitimacy of the FSB is questioned because of 
its limited membership, which is deemed to undermine its capability 
to establish rules with global impact. Non-member jurisdictions could 
always challenge ﬁ nancial standards established to promote global 
compliance. Third, a further question is whether the FSB is equipped 
visited 12.07.2014), and the references in E. Hellneir, ‘What Role for the New Financial 
Stability Board?’, pp. 288–289. For a general overview of Principles-Based Regulation 
and its role prior to and after the crisis, see: J. Black, ‘The Rise, Fall and Fate of Princi-
ples Based Regulation’.
69  J. Black, ‘Restructuring Global and EU Financial Regulation’, p. 45.
70  S.L. Schwarcz, ‘Systemic Risk’, pp. 20–22.
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with adequate organisational support (the FSB has only a tiny staff 
and a small Secretariat as compared to the IMF or WTO) to enable it to 
manage the challenges it faces and to maintain its relevant position in 
global ﬁ nancial governance. Last but not least, the FSB’s position and 
its role in the ﬁ nancial architecture can be also deﬁ ned on the basis of 
its capability to put in place early warning systems and mechanisms 
to prevent or reduce the impact of any future crisis. In this context the 
supposed ‘regime manager’ is seeking to steer the regime, but its role is 
contested when the other actors try to maintain their own autonomy, 
and compliance remains uncertain.
